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ARBITRATION AWARDS IN SHAFF v. SKAHILL
Jacob Frumkin
INTRODUCTION

In Shaff v. SkahilP the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
arbitrators' awards may only be reviewed if the moving party alleges a violation of
the District of Columbia Uniform Arbitration Act.2 From a policy perspective, this
decision may be read as subverting the very objective it purports to supportencouraging the use of arbitration. 3 In brief, this decision may discourage
homeowners from agreeing to arbitrate disputes and appears to penalize those who
do. Furthermore, this decision may be read as weakening the Home Improvement
Business Act 4 by providing a loophole for unlicensed and unbonded de facto
contractors.
Because of these anti-consumer policy implications, the legal analysis section of
this note sets forth a scenario under which the Shaff court might have found for
Ms. Skahill. This alternative outcome combines the definition of "home
improvement contractor" found in Karr v.C. Dudley Brown & Associates Inc.8
with a less restrictive definition of "evident partiality" than that applied in Celtech
Inc. v. Broumand.6 Before constructing this alternative outcome, this section
reviews the procedural posture of Shaff.
The appellant, Steven Shaft, a construction "project manager," and the
appellee, Susan Skahill, the owner of two homes, contracted for the renovation of
the homes. After a contract dispute arose, the parties submitted to binding

1. 617 A.2d 960 (D.C. 1992).
2. D.C CODE AN § 16-4311 (1989).
3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has a clear policy of encouraging the arbitration of
disputes, resulting in part from the onerous caseload in the court. Hercules & Co Ltd. v Shama Restaurant
Corp.. 613 A.2d 916, 922 (D.C. 1992). ("Following centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.
the federal courts have recognized a strong . . . policy in favor of voluntary commercial arbitration . -)
Burchnell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349, 15 L.Ed. 96 (1854) (quoted in Ccltcch Inc. v Broumand
584 A.2d 1257. 1258 (D.C. 1991)) ("Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties
to decide the matters
submitted to them. finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes. (arbitration] should receive
every encouragement from courts of equity
A contrary course %ould be a substitution of the judgment of
the [court system] in place of the [arbitrators] chosen by the parties, and would make an award the
commencement. not the end, of litigation.")
4. D.C CODE ANN. § 2-501 (1989).
5. 567 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1989).
6.

584 A.2d 1257 (D.C. 1991).
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arbitration in which Shaff prevailed. In accordance with District law, 7 Shaff filed a
motion to confirm the arbitrator's award in District of Columbia Superior Court.
At the confirmation hearing, Skahill claimed that the contract was unenforceable
as a matter of law because Shaff was an unlicensed home improvement contractor
who accepted payment in advance of full completion of the contracted work. Judge
Urbina agreed with Skahill and set aside the arbitrator's award. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals reversed Judge Urbina's denial of confirmation of the
arbitrator's award of damages. The court found that Skahill's claim did not meet
the statutory requirements for setting aside an arbitrator's award.
FACTS
Under the contracts signed by the parties, Shaff agreed to serve as "project
manager" for the renovation of the two homes. The contract contained a binding
arbitration clause and a clause asserting that Shaff was "not acting in a licensed/
bonded general contractor's capacity." The terms of payment, also contained in
the contract, called for one third of the total to be paid one week after the job
began; one third to be paid at the completion of plumbing work, porch repairs, and
concrete repairs; and one third to be paid when the job was finished. 8
The District of Columbia Home Improvement Regulations9 bar all persons
except duly licensed home improvement contractors from "requir[ing] or
accept[ing] any payment for a home improvement contract in advance of the full
completion of all work to be performed under the contract." 10 When Skahill
became dissatisfied with Shaff's work, she filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the
contracts were void and unenforceble because Shaff and his partner required and
accepted payment before full completion of the contracted work.', Skahill argued
that the demand and acceptance of payment in advance of the full completion of
all work required to be performed violated the District of Columbia Home
Improvement Regulations. 12 Shaff then filed an unopposed motion, granted by the
court, which stayed judicial proceedings pending arbitration of the dispute.' 3

7. Shaf, 617 A.2d at 962.
8. Id.
9.

10.
I1.
12.
13.

D.C MUN REGS lit 16. § 800.1 (1987).

Shaf, 617 A.2d at 961.
Id. at 962.
D.C MuN REGb tit 16. § 800.1 (1987)
Shaf. 617 A.2d at 962.
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Subsequently, arbitration was held and damages were awarded to ShafP4 who
then moved to confirm the award. Skahill's motion, opposing confirmation of the
arbitrator's award on grounds that the arbitrator failed to correctly apply the law
requiring Shaff to be licensed,1 5 was granted by Judge Urbina. Shaff then
appealed Judge Urbina's order.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In previous decisions, the court has been reluctant to question arbitrators'
determinations. The reluctance is based both on policy considerations 0 and on a
strict construction of the District of Columbia Uniform Arbitration Act. 7 This
statute states "[u]pon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an
[arbitration] award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are
urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award.' 0o The Act sets forth five
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. They are:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral [sic]
or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section
16-4315, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) That there was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under section 16-4312 and the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the
fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a
court of law or equity is not grounds for vacating or refusing to confirm the
award. 0
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See supra. note 3.
17.
18.
19.

D.C CODE ANN. § 16-4301.4319 (1989).
D.C CODE ANN § 16-4310 (1989).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4311 (1989).

368

ARBITRATION AWARDS

Karr v. C. Dudley Brown & Associates Inc.2" articulated a definition of "home
improvement contractor" that relied primarily on the Home Improvement
Regulations2 1 and Truitt v. Miller.2" The regulations define a home improvement
contract as "an agreement for the performance of home improvement work for a
contract price of $300 or more." 23 "Home improvement work" is defined as "the
construction of one or more additions to, some improvement, repair, restoration,
alteration, conversion, or replacement of any residential property. '2 4 Judge Pryor,
writing for the Karr court, agreed with the trial court's conclusion that since the
defendant contractor did not assume "ultimate responsibility" for the completion
of any part of the additions, he was not a "home improvement contractor." 25 The
Karr court thereby reiterated the home-improvement-contractor test first set forth
in Truitt defining a contractor as the vendor who "was actually responsible for
finishing the project." 28
The applicability of the Karr definition to the facts of Shaff is critical to the
construction of an alternative outcome of Shaff. As in Shaff, an action was
brought in D.C. Superior Court when the homeowners, the Karrs, became
dissatisfied with the work of Brown, the vendor. However, unlike Shaff, the
contract did not have a binding arbitration clause and the dispute was never
submitted for arbitration. In further distinction to Shaff, before hiring Brown, the
Karrs had hired Gary Baxter as "the principal contractor in the renovation of their
Victorian homes."' 27 Brown was then hired as a consultant at fifty dollars per hour.
Brown played many roles in the renovation. He advised Baxter and supervised his
work; he performed work on the property; and he provided furnishings.25 Notably
absent is any evidence that payments for work ran through Brown to his employees
or subcontractors. But, in sum, Brown appears to have taken on many
responsibilities of a contractor, if not a general contractor.
It is important to distinguish the procedural postures of Karr and Shaff. Even if
Shaff meets the Karr definition, Skahill still might not be able to appeal the
arbitrator's decision because the standards of review for judicial and arbitration

20. 567 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1989).
21. D.C MUN. REGS tit16, § 800.1 (1987).
22. 407 A.2d 1073 (D.C 1979).
23. D.C, MUN REGS tit16, § 899.1 (1987) cited in Karr, 567 A.2d at 1308.
24. Karr at 1308.
25. Id.
26. Truitt. 407 A.2d at 1079. cited in Karr, 567 A.2d at 1308.
27. Karr 567 A.2d at 1307
28. Id.
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decisions are different. Karr was decided at a bench trial. Appellate review of
bench trials "is governed by the D.C. Code" 29 which provides that "the judgment
may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."'3 There is no equivalent clause in
the standard for review of an arbitrator's decision. But if Karr is read in tandem
with Celtech, an alternative outcome is conceivable.
Celtech is cited in Shaff in support of the proposition "Where, as here, a party
has not sought to vacate an arbitrator's award on statutorily recognized grounds
. . . courts cannot set aside such awards for errors of law or fact made by the
arbitrator."3 1 In Celtech, a dispute arose between a salesperson and his former
employer. The dispute was submitted for arbitration and the arbitrator awarded
the salesperson approximately $5,000. The company appealed the arbitrator's
decision on grounds of "evident partiality,"3 2 claiming that the arbitrator reached
an erroneous decision and did not adequately explain the basis of his decision.'
In denying the company's appeal, the Celtech court narrowly defined evident
partiality for the following policy reason: "To permit 'evident partiality' to be
inferred from the arbitrator's decision on the merits would undercut the
restrictions on judicial review of arbitration proceedings for errors of fact or
law."" However, the limitation on judicial review is not absolute: "If an
arbitrator's words were to manifest an infidelity to the law and a deliberate
disregard of it, this might conceivably amount to 'evident partiality' within the
meaning of the statute. . . . But such an inference of bias could be drawn from an
alleged departure from correct legal principles, if at all, only in extreme and

29. DC CODE ANN § 17-305(a) (1989)
30. Karr 567 A.2d at 1307.
31. Shaff, 617 A.2d at 963.
32. Evident partiality is never precisely defined by the Celtech court. However reference is made to
several cases. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 420 v Kinne) Air Conditioning Co.. 756
F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoted in CeIrech at 1259) (requiring that the moving part) set forth spe ific
facts which indicate improper motives); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co-. 393
U.S.145. 146 (1968)(quoted in Celiech at 1259) (holding evident partiality exists where an arbitrator has had
close financial relations for many years with a party to the arbitration): Reichman v Creative Real Estate
Consultants. Inc.. 476 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoted in Celtech at 1259) (restricting the
evident partiality language of 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) to situations %here the arbitrator has had dealings or
relationships with one of the parties that question his impartiality). Explaining the importance of Reichman.
in n.3. the Celtech court points out that 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) is *'identical for present purposes to DC CODE
ANN. § 16-4311 (a)(2) (1989)." which allows courts to vacate arbitrators' awards when evident partiality is
present.
33. Celtech. 584 A 2d at 1258.
34. Id. at 1259.
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unusual circumstances." 3 5 The Celtech court does not provide examples of how
"extreme and unusual" the circumstances must be;36 however, the fact that the
court does not entirely foreclose claims based on what might be called "inferred
partiality" is critical to imagining an alternative outcome of Shaff.

REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Shaff court held that Skahill did not rely on any of the statutory grounds
for challenging an arbitrator's award.3 7 Rather, Skahill contended that the
arbitrator made a "highly prejudicial error of law" on "the principal grounds that
[Shaff] was an unlicensed home-improvement contractor who required and
accepted payments for home-improvement work in contravention of the licensing
requirement of the District of Columbia."3 Since Skahill's allegations, seen in the
most favorable light, do not meet "statutorily-recognized grounds" 39 Shaff held
"courts cannot set aside such awards for errors of law or fact made by the
arbitrator."40

ANALYSIS
This analysis of Shaff involves two steps. First, it applies the facts of Shaff to
the definition of a contractor found in Karr.' Then, it suggests that having met
the definition set out in Karr, the arbitrator's finding that Shaff was not a
contractor might meet the "inferred partiality" test discussed in the legal
background section of this note.
Much of Skahill's argument rested on the contention that Shaff was a de facto
home improvement contractor.4 2 While the court did not see fit to pass upon this

35. Id. at 1260.
36. In fact, Celtech suggests that examples might be few and far between. The leading support for
inferring bias is the dissent in In re Arbitration Proceedings. 175 N.E.2d 216, 825 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1961).
There, the dissenting Justice Froessel found the award "so shockingly inadequate as to be tantamount to
evident partiality."
37. Shaff, 617 A.2d at 962.
38. Id. at 961.
39. Id. at 963.
40. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24 and 25.
42. Shaff. Brief for Appellee, 91-CV-1389.
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contention, the facts supporting Skahill's contention are critical if an alternative
outcome of Shaff is to be imagined. The contracts' 3 signed by Skahill and Shaff
contained 21 articles; virtually all of them refer to a "contractor." However,
Article 21 contains the handwritten note, "Steven Shaft is the owner's agent/
property manager and is not acting in a licensed/bonded general contractor's
capacity." The front page of the contract, itself titled "Abbreviated Form of
Agreement between Owner and Contractor", has a blank space for the contractor's
name and address. Here, the word "contractor" had been struck out and "project
manager" inserted. In all other places in the document, the word "contractor" was
unaltered.
In the District of Columbia, in order for contracts made by home improvement
contractors requiring payment in advance of the full completion of work to be
enforceable by the contractor, the contractor must be licensed under the Home
Improvement Business Act." Skahill argued that the contract is unenforceble as a
matter of law because Shaft was not licensed. Further, since the contract is
unenforceable as a matter of law, the arbitrator's finding for Shaft constituted a
highly prejudicial error of law.
In support of her argument, Skahill offered that Shaff is a "home improvement
contractor" as defined by the District of Columbia Home Improvement
Regulations.4 5 However, Shaft and his partner deny that they are home
improvement contractors and allege instead that they are "renovation
consultant[s]" and thus are not required to possess a home improvement
contractor's license.
The Shaff court resolved this case through application of the District of
Columbia Uniform Arbitration Act.' This section strictly limits judicial reversals
of arbitrators' awards.4 7 Furthermore, despite the fact that Celtech, quoting San
Martine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Limited,0
intimated that "evident partiality" may be inferred (emphasis added) from "an
infidelity to the law and a deliberate disregard of it,"40 Shaff cited Celtech in

43. See supra note 3.
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 16, § 800.1 (1987).
45. Id.
46. D.C CODE ANN. § 16-4311 (1989).
47. See supra text accompanying note 18.
48. 293 F.2d 796. 801 (1961).
49. San Martine at 801. quoted in Celtech at 1260. This quotation is part of San Martin's distinction
between "manifest disregard" of the law and an error in interpreting it. The court states that manifest
disregard "might be present when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard
44.

372

ARBITRATION AWARDS

support of the proposition that absent allegations an arbitrator has violated the
Uniform Arbitration Act, courts lack the authority to set aside awards for errors
of law or fact."'
The San Martine" quotation in Celtech hints that Shaff may have overstated
Celtech's restrictiveness. San Martine suggested that it is not inconceivable that
evident partiality can be inferred and proposed a test.5 2 If the test for evident
partiality follows the San Martine definition of "manifest disregard,"5' 3 surely part
of the judicial inquiry becomes: "What did the arbitrator know?" At the very
least, San Martine suggests that if Skahill could show that the arbitrator knew the
law, Skahill would be closer to inferred partiality. The fact that no court has found
inferred impartiality5" does not, obviously, strengthen this argument. But saying
that no court has yet found inferred partiality is quite different from stating that
there are no legal grounds for such a finding.
In the present case, even if Skahill had relied on Celtech, she would have had
trouble showing that the arbitrator's words manifested an infidelity to the law and
a deliberate disregard of it because the arbitrator's decision does not discuss the
rationale for concluding that Shaff is not a contractor. However, there is a strong
argument to be made that the Celtech explicit language requirement"5 has at least
one undesirable outcome. That is, an arbitrator motivated by infidelity to the law
-but smart enough not to display it-is afforded greater protection than the wellintentioned but mistaken arbitrator.
In choosing not to address whether Shaff acted as a de facto contractor, the
court puts aside a fairly compelling argument. First, Skahill and Shaft used an
"owner/contractor contract" with "contractor" changed to "project manager."
Second, a close reading of the general disclaimer reveals that Shaff was not
operating as a "general contractor," but neither the disclaimer nor the contract
states that he is not a contractor. In order to be covered by the Home
Improvement Regulations,5" Skahill need only show that Shaff is a contractor.
Whether or not he is a general contractor is irrelevant. Third, many of the tasks to
be performed resemble tasks performed by contractors. The contract indicates that

the same."
50. Celtech, 584 A.2d at 1258, cited in Shaff, 617 A.2d at 963.
51. See supra note 49.
52. See supra note 47.
53. See supra note 41
54. See supra note 35.
55. Celtech, 584 A 2d at 1260.
56. D.C. MUN REGS tit 16. § 800.1 (1987).
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Shaff is responsible for plumbing replacement, kitchen cabinets, appliances,
carpeting, and miscellaneous items. While it might be arguable that all of these
obligations are not tasks, but items to be supplied by Shaft, that logic is hard to
sustain in the case of "plumbing replacement." Finally, there is a strong commonsense argument which takes the form of a question. If Shaft was not responsible
for work being completed, why was one third of the money he was to receive held
back until completion of the work?
Although the Shaff court did not discuss whether Shaft was a home
improvement contractor, it might be argued that he fits the Karr definition. In
contrast to the facts of Karr, Shaft received three lump-sum payments rather than
an hourly" wage. Skahill and Shaft entered into fairly extensive written contracts
setting forth Shaft's responsibilities. Finally, the contract called for progress
payments and guaranteed both price and time of completion. Taken together, these
facts strongly support the inference that Shaft bore "ultimate responsibility" for
the completion of work. If this is true, under Karr, he is a home improvement
contractor. Of course, Skahill still has a way to go to meet the "evident partiality"
test from Celtech because the arbitrator's "words" do not manifest an infidelity to
the law and a deliberate disregard of it. But as is pointed out in this section, it may
be inadvisable to defer to an arbitrator's opinion which fails to state the basis of
the award.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals has again confirmed a "'fundamental and powerful'
[policy] which 'favors arbitration of disputes and narrowly constricts the scope of
judicial intervention." 57 In Shaff, the allegations did not meet the statutory
requirements for vacating arbitration awards set forth in the law.58 Because the
allegations were deficient, the court declined to discuss Shaft's professional status.
Nonetheless, because the facts of the case suggest so strongly that Shaft was
operating as an unlicensed home improvement contractor, an alternative outcome
for Shaff may be constructed. First, instead of claiming that the arbitrator
committed a "highly prejudicial error of law," Skahill would argue that the
arbitrator's decision evidenced "evident partiality." This argument relies primarily
on the fact that Shaft was a de facto home improvement contractor. Then,

57.
58.

Hercules & Co Ltd. v. Shama Restaurant Corp.. 613 A2d 916 (D.C. 1992).

DC

CODE ANN

§ 16-4311 (1989).
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employing a broad reading of Celtech, inferred impartiality might be found.
The possibility of an alternative outcome under Celtech suggests that in light of
Karr and the facts of this case, the Shaff court is offering too much protection to
de facto home improvement contractors. As it stands, Shaff has three likely
consequences. Unknowledgeable homeowners are put at a disadvantage to
knowledgeable, unlicensed home improvement consultants at arbitration.
Knowledgeable homeowners are unlikely to agree to arbitration at all. The court,
rather than arbitration panels, will resolve increasing numbers of home
improvement disputes. Finally, consumer protection offered by the Home
Improvement Business Act, 59 which requires contractors to be licensed and
bonded, will be lessened.
It is fairly clear that a knowledgeable homeowner will not sign an arbitration
clause if an unlicensed home improvement contractor is involved. This likely result
completely controverts the court's intent to increase the use of arbitration.00
Simply put, if parties refuse arbitration altogether, the arbitrator's authority is
theoretical. Furthermore, if judicial reluctance to overturn arbitrators' awards is
based on the parties having willingly submitted to arbitration, it seems unfair to
fail to inquire as to what the parties thought they were agreeing to. It may be true
that commercial entities should not receive judicial protection from erroneous
arbitration awards, but when knowledgeable commercial persons or entities
contract with unknowledgeable homeowners, the homeowner's reasonable
expectations should not be ignored by the court. In other words, while it is true
that the unknowledgeable homeowner agreed to arbitration, it is unlikely that the
unknowledgeable homeowner meant to agree to arbitration in which the arbitrator
does not have to follow the law. Thus, the clear but simplistic philosophy - as the
parties agreed to arbitration, the arbitrator's award should receive great deference
from the court, is seriously questioned when an unknowledgeable homeowner
attaches reasonable expectations to her agreement to arbitrate.
Unknowledgeable homeowners effectively sign away the protection they are
afforded by the Home Improvement Regulations 1 and the Home Improvement
Business Act 62 when they agree to arbitrate disputes. Of course, unknowledgeable
homeowners are not signing away all of their common law rights. They are only
relinquishing their right to have the contract declared unenforceable as a matter of

59. DC CODE A'', § 2-501 (1989).
60. See supra note 3.
61. D.C MUN RECGS
TIT 16 § 8001 (1987)
62. D.C CODE A-,,, § 2-501 (1989).
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law. Insofar as an unlicensed contractor has assets sufficient to satisfy a judgment
for breach of contract, perhaps no harm is done.
But Shaff seems to have a far more disturbing policy implication. If the
unlicensed contractor is judgment-proof, the purpose of the Home Improvement
Business Act is subverted because the Shaff court has invited de facto home
improvement contractors to operate without licenses and bonds. To cite a
hypothetical example, if an unknowledgeable homeowner contracts with a
knowledgeable unlicensed contractor, the contractor will be able to accept payment
in advance, go broke, and walk off the job. Since the intent of the Home
Improvement Business Act was probably not to give homeowners a quick course in
caveat emptor, perhaps the court is out of alignment with legislative intent.
Although it is true that Skahill failed to allege statutory grounds for setting
aside an arbitration award, the Shaff court may have unwittingly undercut its
desire to increase the use of arbitration. Furthermore, the court may also have
weakened the effect of the Home Improvement Business Act. Absent clear judicial
or legislative standards for inferred impartiality, the Court of Appeals may be wise
to retain its present posture. Nevertheless, given the anti-consumer effect of the
current restrictive definition, in future cases in which "evident partiality" is
alleged, the court should consider loosening the standard introduced in Celtech.
Judicial policy, the public good, and legislative intent may be well served by such a
reevaluation.

